Housing privatization and the return of the state: changing governance in China by Wu, F
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rurb20
Urban Geography
ISSN: 0272-3638 (Print) 1938-2847 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rurb20
Housing privatization and the return of the state:
changing governance in China
Fulong Wu
To cite this article: Fulong Wu (2018): Housing privatization and the return of the state: changing
governance in China, Urban Geography, DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2018.1440126
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2018.1440126
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 02 Mar 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 291
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Housing privatization and the return of the state: changing
governance in China
Fulong Wu
Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Housing privatization seems to suggest a process of state retreat.
However, this is not always the case in China. This paper examines
an estate that is mixed with work-unit housing and municipal
public housing to understand its changing governance. It is intri-
guing to observe that the state has had to return to this neighbor-
hood to strengthen its administration following housing
privatization, because the attempt to transfer responsibility to
commercial property management failed. The neighborhood gov-
ernance, however, has transformed from one based on work-units
to a government-funded administrative agency. The return of the
state has been achieved through professional social workers, and
it is struggling to operate, leading to the alienation and disempo-
werment of former state work-unit residents. The side eﬀect of this
approach to governance is that, through encouraging market
provision and commercial operation which is not fully working,
reciprocal activities are restrained. Since housing privatization, the
neighborhood has deteriorated from a brand-new estate into an
‘old and dilapidated neighborhood’ in less than 25 years.
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Introduction
The neighborhood is an important spatial form to foster social bonding (Putnam, 2001).
Despite the coming of an urban age, a small living space like a neighborhood cherished by
everyone arguably still plays a role in place-making (Friedmann, 2010). Forrest and Kearns
(2001) emphasize that the neighborhood is a key dimension for maintaining social cohesion.
In the UK, the signiﬁcance of the neighborhood was highlighted in area-based regeneration
under New Labor (Kearns & Parkinson, 2001) as well as in recent localism’s support for the
community. The signiﬁcance of the neighborhood persists in urban policies (Kearns &
Forrest, 2000; Paddison, 2001). With the growing importance of ﬂows of people, goods and
information, andwith greatermobility, territorialized social practices are crucial, as argued by
van Kempen and Wissink (2014, p. 95), because “Neighborhoods continue to play a role in
the actions and imaginations of people, neighborhood organizations, and government
policies. People still live in neighborhoods, and government still tries to solve often severe
social problems through neighborhood policies.” Neighborhood-level social–spatial inequal-
ities have signiﬁcant impacts on social cohesion (Cassiers & Kesteloot, 2012).
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The rise of private governance in the form of gated communities is a salient feature
of changing neighborhood governance (Blakely & Snyder, 1997). There are extensive
studies of middle-class neighborhoods and gentriﬁcation (Lees, 2008). On the other
hand, economic restructuring and a changing political economic environment have
created acute pressures on working-class neighborhoods (Ward, Fagan, McDowell,
Perrons, & Ray, 2007). At the other extreme, territorial stigmatization strongly targeted
speciﬁc neighborhoods and aﬀected ethnically diverse communities in Britain (Slater &
Anderson, 2012), and social exclusion occured in poor neighborhoods (Musterd, Murie
& Kesteloot, 2006). Racial practices and stigmatization suppressed civic development in
American ghettos (Wacquant, 2008). In the post-socialist economies, neoliberalism and
market transition have transformed domestic and neighborhood lives (Smith &
Rochovska, 2007). Commodiﬁcation seems to be a major process that aﬀects neighbor-
hood governance.
While there has been a burgeoning literature on urban China (Friedmann, 2005;
Hsing, 2010; Logan, 2008; Ma, 2002) and neighborhood governance (Boland & Zhu
2012; Bray, 2005, 2006; Read, 2000, 2012; Tomba, 2005, 2014; Wu, 2002), these studies
paid more attention to the new forms of gated communities built under the housing
market (Huang, 2006; Pow, 2009; Zhang, 2010) or informal urban villages (Wang,
Wang, & Wu, 2009; Wu, Zhang, & Webster, 2013). The re-establishment of neighbor-
hood governance through expanding the role of previous neighborhood organizations
such as residents’ committees is well documented (Read, 2000; Tomba, 2014; Wu,
2002). However, it is not entirely clear why housing privatization has not led to greater
self-governance. How does the state manage to maintain control in work-unit housing
areas where service provision has been largely privatized? The current literature
emphasizes the state’s desire to control or using new techniques to govern (e.g. Ong,
2007; Read, 2012; Tomba, 2014), while paying insuﬃcient attention to contextual
neighborhood changes. More importantly, the maintenance of the state’s role is not
contradictory with the deployment of market instruments (Wu, 2017a) because the
latter has left a vacuum of governance that requires state intervention. This paper will
provide a more nuanced understanding of the implication of housing privatization for
neighborhood governance, using a public housing area that consists of both work-unit
and municipal housing as an example. While the speciﬁcity of the work-unit housing
should be taken into account, the observation opens up the possibility to think about
other neighborhoods in a similar way.
This study chose an ex-public housing neighborhood in Nanjing, which was jointly
invested in and constructed by several state work-units in the mid-1980s, just before the
introduction of the housing market and housing privatization. The Fifth Village (a
pseudonym) is located on the edge of Nanjing. Because Nanjing was a relatively
compact city, the distance from the neighborhood to the city center only takes about
30 minutes by bicycle. The area is now part of the city proper.
Changing neighborhood governance in urban China
In this section, the features of neighborhood governance prior to economic reform, the
initiative to “build communities” under economic reform, and rising “private govern-
ance” are reviewed to identify research gaps.
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The dominance of state work-units in urban governance prior to economic
reform
Under state socialism, state work-units (danwei) were the main organizers of neighbor-
hood life (Bray, 2006; Friedmann, 2005, 2007; Whyte & Parish, 1984; Wu, 2002). This
created an organized dependence on the state, known as “communist neo-
traditionalism” (Walder, 1986), which replicated the traditional features of stable
neighborhoods. The neighborhoods of municipal housing and work-unit compounds
are diﬀerent, because “[the work-unit community] is already part of a rational, future-
oriented, diﬀerentiated, technological structure, and it has been quite eﬀective in
important modernization tasks. It is a community within modernity, within a division
of labor – a transﬁgured community” (Womack, 1991, p. 330). This argument distin-
guishes two types of neighborhoods and their governance prior to economic reform:
neighborhoods that relied on state work-units and neighborhoods that were based on
informal neighborhood organizations that were still under the supervision of the state.
State work-units played a key role in housing provision and organized social lives
(Logan, Fang, & Zhang, 2010; Walder, 1986). The strong capacity of governance was in
contrast to weaker governance in old neighborhoods which were more or less based on
self-organization by residents’ committees (ju wei hui) served by retired people and
housewives (Read, 2000; Whyte & Parish, 1984).
The decline of work-units and “community construction” since the 1990s
Market-oriented reform in the 1990s has created great impacts on neighborhood
governance (Friedmann, 2005). Along with economic decentralization, Chinese cities
have seen the inﬂux of rural migrants and laid-oﬀ workers who are no longer attached
to state work-units. These were private sector workers outside the traditional mechan-
ism of social control, and thus it was an imperative to reconnect those outsiders with
the state; this has been achieved through the top-down “community construction”
initiative (Bray, 2006; Friedmann, 2005, 2007; Heberer & Göbel, 2011; Read, 2000;
Shi & Cai, 2006; Shieh & Friedmann, 2008; Wu, 2002).
The initiative of “community construction” arguably strengthened state control.
Wong and Poon (2005) argue that the institution of the neighborhood has been
transformed from “serving neighbors to recontrolling urban society.” The policy
aimed to recreate a close and intimate small space where social surveillance could be
eﬀectively achieved. In Shanghai, urban governance adopted a new model of two levels
of government (municipality and district governments) and three levels of administra-
tion (adding the street oﬃce of government). Later the system was extended to include
the fourth layer of residents’ committees as the agent of local government (Wu, 2002).
The development of residents’ committees represents the extension of state governance
into the neighborhood (Read, 2000).
Rising property rights awareness in gated communities since the 2000s
The retreat of the state from housing provision and the emergence of entrepreneurial
governance have been arguably characterized as neoliberal urbanism (He & Wu, 2009;
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Walker & Buck, 2007), echoing a process of “neoliberalization” (Harvey, 2005). The
demise of danwei as an organizational form of urban governance is the major change
(Bray, 2005; Huang, 2006; Logan et al., 2010; Wu, 2002). It is observed that traditional
forms of social bonding are declining, showing up as less frequent neighborhood
activities (Forrest & Yip, 2007), while social networks grow beyond neighborhoods
(Hazelzet & Wissink, 2012).
There have been extensive studies on the emergence of new residential forms of
“gated communities” in China (Huang, 2006; Pow, 2009; Zhang, 2010) and the rise of
homeowners’ associations in these new neighborhoods (Fu & Lin, 2014; Read, 2003; Shi
& Cai, 2006; Tomba, 2005, 2014). Though social interaction at the neighborhood level
has declined (Forrest & Yip, 2007), middle-class housing estates retain strong place
aﬀection and attachment (Zhu, Breitung, & Li, 2012) and strong awareness of their
property rights (Tomba, 2005), perhaps due to shared identity and interest in property.
Read (2012) studied the residents’ committee as government sponsored network as a
form of “administrative grassroots engagement” to embody governance and facilitate
policing at the most local level. His research reveals the connection between the state
and society within the neighborhood. Tomba (2014) highlights the importance of
neighborhood as the place where residents’ everyday lives are governed at a distance
by the government. In other words, it is in the neighborhood that the state’s author-
itarian governance is achieved. Rather than seeing the trend towards more tightly
controlled neighborhoods, Gui, Ma, and Mühlhahn (2009) suggest the emergence of
increasingly fragmented neighborhood organizations. Neighborhood elections and new
approaches to welfare delivery have been experimented with (Derleth & Koldyk, 2004;
Friedmann, 2011). Thus, the dichotomist state–society approach becomes inappropriate
because a third realm, which is between the state and the market, has been created at
the neighborhood level (Gui et al., 2009). However, Fu and Lin (2014) show that
undeveloped social capital led to the lack of civic engagement and in turn made the
homeowners’ association a weak territorial organization.
From the above review, we can see that commodity housing development tends to
enhance the awareness of property rights. Shared interests and identity may challenge
the state and require more grassroots democracy (Cai & Sheng, 2013; Fu & Lin, 2014;
Shi & Cai, 2006; Shin, 2013). The question is then how does the state manage to
continue to enforce its control even when facing strong property rights awareness? How
does the process work in work-unit housing areas where property rights awareness is
much weaker? We need to understand commodiﬁcation, privatization and state-led
“community building” as complementary processes to foster state hegemony.
The context of the case and research methodology
The Fifth Village is located not too far from the central areas but connection with the
city is not very easy. The place was relatively isolated and conﬁned by a river that was
also used for sewer discharge, cutting oﬀ the roads to the city. Cyclists used the rugged
riverbanks to travel to the city in the 1990s. The area was close to the docklands along
the Yangtze River where manual workers lived. This was the edge of the city.
Before 1949 rural refugees concentrated in the area and built simple shacks. The
place was gradually converted into shantytowns. In the 1980s the city of Nanjing
4 F. WU
decided to renew this area because it was visible from trains across the Yangtze River
Bridge to the city (a deputy director of city planning bureau, July 2001). The area was
also chosen because there were farm lands and vacant low lands. The population
density was relatively low. The pressure to rehouse the original residents was lower.
In 1986 the urban redevelopment oﬃce launched this project to develop a large
estate. The project rehoused relocated households from nearby old areas. Two work-
units also bought six residential buildings for their staﬀ. The total area was 8.2 hectares.
The total building ﬂoor space was 104,000 square meters. The estate consisted of 35
residential buildings, one nursery, one primary school and some buildings for shops
along the main road in 1987. In 2001, more buildings were added, totaling 52 buildings
in the Fifth Village, accommodating 2,565 households and a population of 7,472 persons
(the director of residents’ committee, July 2002). About ten years after the estate was
built, China initiated full-ﬂedged housing commodiﬁcation (Hsing, 2010; Logan, 2008),
which had an immense impact on this public housing estate.
This study is based on the experience of living in this neighborhood from 1987 to
1991 and ethnographic observation from regular visits thereafter. In the period between
2001 and 2004, an initial investigation of neighborhood governance was done through
semi-structured interviews of oﬃcers and directors of the neighborhood as well as
residents living in the neighborhood, in response to the policy to promote “community
construction” (Boland & Zhu, 2012; Derleth & Koldyk, 2004; Friedmann, 2011; Read,
2000; Shieh & Friedmann, 2008; Tomba, 2014). In 2008, investigation focused on the
sale of ex-public housing. The two major estate agents in the area and eight residents
who became owners through privatization were interviewed. In 2014 interviews were
conducted with the street oﬃces of the government (which is also known as the “sub-
district” government (Derleth & Koldyk, 2004)) and residents’ committees. Overall, 21
unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted. Whenever possible, the
interviews were triangulated through conversations with estate agents, residents, and
neighborhood cadres. It must be emphasized that the semi-structured interviews were
done through a more formal process with government and neighborhood oﬃcials
compared with many informal conversations with the residents (which are not counted
as interviews). Due to familiarity with the neighborhood and ﬁve years’ living experi-
ence, triangulation of conversations has been possible. These interviews lasted over a
long period of time because of the sustained research interest in micro-level state
control. While less formally organized as a research project which tends to use cross-
section method, I believe this “longitudinal” approach helps to reveal the long-term
trend. Some data were collected from Nanjing Real Estate Market 2000, which provides
some basic information about housing prices at the neighborhood level in 2000. This is
now supplemented by more detailed housing market data from 2014. As the study does
not aim to provide detailed information about the housing market, no systematic eﬀort
was spent comparing housing prices with other areas.
Housing privatization and the retreat of the state
The most signiﬁcant implication of housing privatization is changing property manage-
ment. Responsibility has been transferred from individual work-units that owned
housing to the property management company that was recruited to take charge of
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property and estate maintenance. This was justiﬁed by the fact that through housing
privatization the sitting tenants of public housing have become homeowners. However,
since housing privatization property maintenance in this estate has faced diﬃculties.
For example, a sewer was blocked because some residents poured rubbish into it during
housing refurbishment (a homeowner, August 2008). The estate department of work-
places was no longer responsible for dredging because the housing had been privatized.
On the other hand, the residents failed to coordinate themselves because not every
household was aﬀected by this problem at the same time. Thus, residents had to ask a
private plumber to drill a hole in the external wall to set up a simple duct outside the
building when the problem arose.
The most salient feature is that the state withdrew from “neighborhood services,” a
term virtually unknown until the early 1990s. Before that time services at the neighbor-
hood level were conﬁned to assistance provided to the poor families that received welfare
beneﬁts from the civil aﬀairs department. These mainly included disaster relief and social
assistance to the handicapped and the elderly (Solinger & Hu, 2011; Womack, 1991). For
most residents, services were provided through their workplaces as occupational beneﬁts.
In the 1950s, street oﬃces began to organize housewives and self-employed people into
street handicraft workshops and small factories. This laid down the foundation of the
“street collective economy.” The development of the collective economy helped provide
employment to those who were unable to be formally recruited by state-owned enter-
prises. In the 1980s, because of the return of urban youth from the countryside, unem-
ployment pressure increased. Street oﬃces organized various street services such as TV
repairs, barbers, and housing maintenance to absorb the returnees from the countryside
(an oﬃcer in the residents’ committee, July 2002). As a result, neighborhood services
became an important sector of the collective economy, but they were operated on a small
scale, similar to social enterprises.
The major change came in 1992 when the State Council classiﬁed neighborhood
services as tertiary industry. This opened the door to the commodiﬁcation of public
services at the grassroots. In the 1990s, the decision to commercialize neighborhood
services led to the proliferation of businesses run by street oﬃces. For example, in the
Fifth Village, the street oﬃce owned the premises of small shops and convenience stores
along the main road and leased them to private businesses. The income drawn from the
rental was used to subsidize the budget of the street oﬃce (a street oﬃcer, July 2002).
Similarly, the residents’ committee maintained a local community center and managed
some simple one-story shacks to accommodate rural migrants. These business activities
generated income to subsidize the operational costs of the residents’ committee. In the
1990s, residents’ committees managed to tap into market resources to provide paid
services to residents. Shanghai even adopted a tax rebate policy to stimulate the
development of a street economy (a street oﬃce manager, Shanghai, August 2002).
Under the policy, street oﬃces enthusiastically supported the registration of private
business in their territories for the rebate of value added tax.
At the very beginning of promoting the privatization of neighborhood services, there
were debates about whether neighborhood services were public goods delivery or a
business of the service industry: “We believe the policies were contradictory; the State
Council decision was not the same as the notice sent by the Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs.
The latter believed service is for public goods. Now the neighborhood service is ‘one
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servant for two masters.’ That was really confusing, and the purpose of developing
neighborhood services was quite diﬀerent!” (a civil aﬀairs oﬃcial, August 2002).
The premises along the main road of the Fifth Village were sold to private companies
around 2000. The street oﬃce no longer collected rentals from these properties. In the
2000s, the street oﬃce managed to use the roads inside the neighborhood for parking
trucks and other vehicles to earn parking fees. After 2008 the residents’ committee no
longer managed parking spaces because of the shortage of parking space and potential
liability. The collection of parking fees may also create liability complications. In the
Fifth Village, the street oﬃce director mentioned an incident where two drivers fought
for a parking space, resulting in one driver being seriously injured. “[The other driver]
had to pay a compensation of 80,000 yuan to get the settlement. This would bring us a
lot of troubles if we had collected parking fees!” (director of residents’ committee,
November 2014). The street oﬃce and residents’ committee played the role of arbitrator
rather than stakeholder. Commercial activities have now been stripped from the
operations of the street oﬃce and residents’ committee. The street oﬃce is now entirely
dependent upon the budget assigned from the district government, and in turn the
residents’ committee operates on speciﬁcally allocated funds for administrative tasks.
In the Fifth Village, there used to be some one-storey houses and shacks managed by
the residents’ committee for renting to rural migrants. But nearby commodity housing
development projects demolished these premises. Originally, the neighborhood controlled
a grocery market and collected a maintenance fee. But since the street market was moved
into a formal indoor market, the residents’ committee can no longer collect the fee. In
some old neighborhoods, the residents’ committee undertook small services such as milk
and newspaper deliveries, or introducing nannies and domestic helpers. But all these
services have been fully commercialized. For example, there are special domestic helper
centers. In the Fifth Village, commercially operated sports and recreational activities are
organized by private businesses. Some outdoor sports facilities were invested in by the
street oﬃce of the government under speciﬁc funding and opened to the public.
The insulation of the residents’ committee from market operation is due to two
considerations. First, involvement in the market proved to create many irregularities
and even corruption because the director acted as both cadre and businessperson.1
Second, regulation prevented the residents’ committee from evolving into an independent
“self-organized mass organization” through gaining independent ﬁnancial sources.2 In this
direction, residents’ committees might become charities or non-government organizations
(NGOs) with their own business accounts. This direction of change was regarded as
undesirable by the state because it would weaken state control over neighborhood
governance. The policy of separating business and residents’ committees has transformed
the nature of the residents’ committee from an organization that comprehensively deals
with neighborhood aﬀairs into a public administration agency.
The imperative for an enhanced state presence in neighborhood
governance
In this section, I will explain why privatization is not a one-way trajectory. The failure
of commercial property management in many work-unit housing areas creates an
imperative for the state to return in a more territorialized form. In the period of
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socialism, the street oﬃce together with a neighborhood organization played a com-
plementary role in social welfare and service provision. Their main targets were
residents without workplace aﬃliation and the recipients of beneﬁts from the civil
aﬀairs department, including the handicapped, widows, the elderly without children,
veterans, and their families, while the majority of the population depended upon their
workplaces for social services (Solinger & Hu, 2011). Neighborhood management
remained underdeveloped until the introduction of privatization. Treating neighbor-
hood management as paid services created a chance for developing property services
through the market. Along with the unfolding of full-ﬂedged privatization, public
spaces have been privatized into commercial premises, and residents’ committees no
longer provide services that can be delivered commercially. Property management
companies were introduced to take over some functions.
While work-unit housing has been privatized, the road to a self-governed neighbor-
hood has not been smooth. It is diﬃcult to recruit a property management company in
this work-unit housing area because the residents could not aﬀord the maintenance fees
or were reluctant to pay them (a street property service manager, November 2014). After
privatization, “We tried very hard to ﬁnd a property management company [to look after
the estate], but you know the maintenance cost is very high” (director of street oﬃce,
November 2014). Of 47 old and dilapidated residential districts in the territory of the
street oﬃce, only eight are managed by property management companies, only one is
formally managed by the homeowners’ association, and about 27 residential estates are
managed directly by the street oﬃce. The remaining 11 neighborhoods were left to the
residents themselves, which basically means a lack of maintenance (street oﬃce director,
November 2014). Because of the diﬃculty of collecting property management fees, the
property management company that took charge of the Fifth Village abruptly withdrew
its service, leaving the neighborhood in a state of limbo (director of residents’ committee,
November 2014). After property management companies abandoned their role, the street
oﬃce had to ask the residents’ committee to do what it could – according to the director,
“Our ability is at most to do some small ﬁxes and repairs” (the director, November 2014).
As early as 2000, there were many signs of deterioration, for example, broken windows,
under-maintained bushes, and sewage blockages.
The failure of commercial operation imposes signiﬁcant demands for the state to
maintain its role in neighborhood governance. In contrast to urban villages that draw
income from the assets under village collectives (Po, 2008), the work-unit housing
neighborhood has limited resources and has to depend on government funding.
Moreover, as a modern public housing estate, the Fifth Village does not have many
commercial establishments in its jurisdiction area. Therefore, the neighborhood has been
constrained by resources to support neighborhood services. Following housing privatiza-
tion, the residents’ committee is no longer supported by the work units and so has to
approach those enterprises within the area for “donations.” The director of the residents’
committee described how they were just like a “Buddhist monk begging for alms”. For
services that can possibly be privatized, residents have to pay for themselves. “We don’t
have to do anything. In fact, we can do nothing. All we could do is to ﬁx small problems
here and there” (a residents’ committee oﬃcer, November 2014). When asked who would
pay for maintaining trees and grass in the neighborhood, the oﬃcer in the street oﬃce was
anxious: “This is the area where you spend money but don’t see where it has gone. Trees,
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bushes and grass grow every year, and so you have to pay for them every year. We just
spent 200,000 yuan on the maintenance of green spaces. Whenever possible, we just had
to convert grassland into hard surfaces. We had no choice” (a street property manage-
ment oﬃcer, November 2014). The continuing pressure on the residents’ committee
means it has to be professionalized through state funding.
The return of the state as a territorialized form of governance
Increasing size of residents’ committee and its professionalization
Housing commodiﬁcation has led to greater residential mobility in urban China.
Private sector workers are no longer aﬃliated to a state workplace that operates as an
institution for social management (Walder, 1986). The inﬂux of rural migrants has
increased residential diversity. The bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises led to mil-
lions of laid-oﬀ workers who were transferred from workplaces to the places where they
live (Solinger & Hu, 2011). Residential relocation created the problem of the mismatch
of the location of household registration and the actual place of living. In short, urban
China in the aftermath of commodiﬁcation has seen an unprecedented tendency
towards ungovernable spaces (Wu, 2002). Confronted with an increasingly ﬂuid society,
the state strived to consolidate neighborhood governance (Read, 2000; Tomba, 2014).
Moreover, there has also been an increasing practical need to deliver social assistance to
those who are not within the state enterprise system. The residents’ committee thus has
been chosen as a territorialized form of governance.
Previously in this large residential area, there were three residents’ committees served
by retired people and housewives. In 2000, they were dismissed, and the three residents’
committees were merged into a single residents’ committee (a residents’ committee
oﬃcer, July 2002), which later is known as shequ. The new residents’ committee is
served by professional social workers recruited formally by the street oﬃce of the
government. The cadres came from other places. Although in theory local residents
are also eligible to serve the residents’ committee, in practice it is diﬃcult ﬁnd profes-
sional social workers in the same neighborhood. Oﬃcials were appointed based on
education attainment and qualiﬁcation, regardless of whether they came from local
communities. The residents’ committee has a proper oﬃce with desks and ﬁling
cabinets. It has become a de facto government agency performing administrative duties.
Regular administrative tasks include delivery of social assistance, family planning,
neighborhood education, health and hygiene campaigns, women’s aﬀairs, organizing
neighborhood cultural and sport activities, mediation of neighborhood and domestic
conﬂicts, and maintenance of public space.
The residents’ committee plays an important role in neighborhood governance. For
example, in this neighborhood, the cadres should pay home visits to a family that had
lost a member to explain funeral and interment procedures (a street oﬃcer,
November 2014). The oﬃce is in charge of allocation of minimum livelihood support
and other welfare beneﬁts from the civil aﬀairs department (Solinger & Hu, 2011). The
residents’ committee also tries to maintain contacts with poor families in the neighbor-
hood. In the 2000s, the residents’ committee also helped to verify rental spaces for rural
migrants and checked their family planning measures. Other tasks in more informal
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peri-urban villages include the creation of new addresses for rental properties so that
migrants living in these properties could be “geo-located” (a district planning oﬃcer,
August 2010). In some informal urban areas, new address plates were created for the
rooms accommodating rural migrants.
The major change for the residents’ committee is the bureaucratization of the
organization. Initially in 1954 the organizational law of residents’ committees stipulated
the residents’ committee as a “self-organized mass organization.” Subsequently in 1989
the law deﬁned it as a “resident self-managed, self-educated, and self-served local mass
self-organized organization” (Womack, 1991), though in reality the residents’ commit-
tee is always guided by the government and is thus diﬀerent from “grassroots organiza-
tions” in the West. The original size of the residents’ committee was relatively modest.
The residents’ committees in the Fifth Village were each in charge of 100 to 700
households and staﬀed by ﬁve to nine people, mainly from the neighborhood. In
2001, it managed 7,472 residents (a residents’ committee oﬃcer, July 2002). But in
2014, the Fifth Village residents’ committee needed to serve more than 11,000 residents,
about ten percent of whom were rural migrants (director of residents’ committee,
November 2014).
The separation between social management and commercial services
The budget of the residents’ committee is allocated by the street oﬃce of the govern-
ment. Compared with the huge demand for assistance and management, the budget has
been always seen as inadequate. In 2002, the street oﬃce only allocated 180 Yuan per
month, which was barely enough for telephone bills and oﬃce stationery. The director
of the Fifth Village residents’ committee complained, “We don’t have enough funding.
We often have to go back to our original workplaces to make photocopies of admin-
istrative forms” (director of residents’ committee, July 2002). In 2014, the annual
budget increased to 50,000 Yuan, but this is still short of covering the basic operational
costs (director of residents’ committee, November 2014), although when asked about
the use of stationery, the director said that it could be simply obtained from the oﬃce.
Being a cadre in a residents’ committee is hard work. They often have to work
overtime, especially when the city organizes mega events. During the Youth Olympic
Games in the summer of 2014, the cadres of residents’ committees had to carry out
security checks and patrol the neighborhood to ensure there would be no social
incidents. For young professional social workers, “The pay is not high enough com-
pared with private sector jobs; young social workers also keep an eye on other
possibilities” (director of residents’ committee, November 2014). Recently, six social
workers resigned from the residential estates under the street oﬃce. In the Fifth Village:
“We just lost two social workers. We are unable to ﬁll these posts because the district
government has not started its formal recruitment” (ibid).
Now, diﬀerent from the early stage of market reform, the residents’ committee is
forbidden to tap into market resources and has turned into a purely administrative
agency. For example, residents’ committees are no longer allowed to operate housing
rentals or maintenance charges. Parking charges from spaces inside the neighborhood
are submitted directly to the property management company. In fact, all paid services
have been transferred to the property management company. This regulation reduced
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irregularities in the residents’ committee but at the same time constrained its resources.
As a neighborhood organization, the residents’ committee has to cope with requests
from various government departments. However, its funding mode reﬂects the nature
of the residents’ committee as an administrative agency. The street oﬃce allocates the
basic budget covering the salaries of cadres. Other government departments can also
ask the residents’ committee as the “agent on the ground” to carry out speciﬁc tasks.
But they have to assign speciﬁc budget to cover these costs. For example, when the
Bureau of Statistics needs to organize a survey of urban livelihoods, it asks the residents’
committee to contact residents in the neighborhood to book-keep their daily spending.
Then the residents’ committee receives a speciﬁc fund for handling the accounts of
surveyed households. This practice of budget allocation on the basis of speciﬁc tasks
helps to maintain the residents’ committee as the agent of the government.
The return of the state to an enhanced neighborhood governance
The original rationale of consolidating neighborhood governance in the aftermath of
privatization was to re-create a territorial form of social relations, resembling the
environment of the workplace where oﬃcials were familiar with their employees and
thus provided eﬀective management. However, as can be seen from the Fifth Village, it
is not easy to institutionalize the residents’ committee in the same way as state work-
units, because in this work-unit housing estate there is a severe resource constraint. To
increase administration capacities, the street oﬃce of the government has to merge
smaller residents’ committees into a large residential community (shequ) organization
and professionalize the operation of shequ. The new enlarged residents’ committee has
been professionalized.
However, the reform of neighborhood governance to achieve economies of scale
comes at the cost of declining territorial social relations, because the consolidated
residents’ committee serves a very large territory and its oﬃcials are appointed
from other places. The residents’ committee is a non-democratically elected body
which is not allowed to collect fees for its services to the neighborhood. It carries
out purely administrative tasks assigned by the government. Many amalgamated
residents’ committees are too large for residents to know them personally.
Unfamiliarity with the residents’ committees has led to declining reciprocal social
capital. In this peri-urban neighborhood, a series of privatization movements (in
housing and neighborhood services) has not created a homeowners’ association, as
in middle-class commodity housing neighborhoods (Read, 2000, 2012; Tomba,
2005, 2014; Zhang, 2010). When asked about the possibility of setting up a
homeowners’ association, a resident replied (August 2008): “You mean us? Yes, I
think I am an owner but I don’t know what the homeowners’ association is for. I
hope this is not another way of collecting money!” Up to 2015, there was still no
sign of setting up a homeowners’ association, as the issue was deemed less relevant
to this former work-unit housing area. In contrast to the newer middle class, the
homeowners of previous work-unit housing do not feel a strong sense of owner-
ship or property rights. They recognize the ownership right of their properties. But
in terms of housing management, because of the low aﬀordability constraint, they
do not understand that their ownership could extend their control over the
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 11
neighborhood governance. In contrast, they are aware of the possibility of an
increasing ﬁnancial burden, as the government now requires them to look after
their property management through commercial services.
Implications for neighborhood governance: alienation and
disempowerment
As a legacy of the centrally planned economy, ordinary residents in China were not
involved in decision-making on urban development. Despite strong bonding in work-
unit living quarters, residents did not participate in neighborhood management. The
residents, as state employees, relied on the estate department of their workplaces to
carry out property maintenance. For municipal housing tenants, the Bureau of Housing
Management was in charge of property maintenance. If work-unit housing tenants or
municipal public housing tenants were not satisﬁed with the service, the residents had
to resort to their employer or public housing management section. In the Fifth Village,
the workplace appointed an oﬃcer of neighborhood aﬀairs to liaise with the neighbor-
hood. “If we have any repairs, we just ask our danwei [work-units]; the estate belonged
to the danwei anyway. Why should we contact the residents’ committee? They would
not do the work for us” (a resident, July 2002). The residents thus had little chance to
participate in neighborhood activity.
In newer housing estates, particularly those developed in suburban areas, home-
owners are becoming more active in neighborhood governance. Housing commodiﬁca-
tion has created stronger awareness of property rights (Shin, 2013; Tomba, 2005).
Residents set up homeowners’ associations to represent their interests (Fu & Lin,
2014). The homeowners’ associations may then decide on the appointment of property
management companies. In these gated communities, the rise of homeowners’ associa-
tions has challenged the authority of the residents’ committees (Pow, 2009; Read, 2012).
The eﬀorts of the government to strengthen the role of residents’ committees in newer
and gated housing estates is resisted by homeowners. For better-oﬀ residents, moving
into a new commodity housing estate provides privacy (Pow, 2009; Zhang, 2010). Some
homeowners believe that privacy gives them the freedom to be away from the social
surveillance of residents’ committees in public housing neighborhoods. In these newer
housing estates, because the property management company is able to collect main-
tenance fees, these estates are generally well maintained and even secured with private
security guards. The management service provided by the property management com-
pany reduces the workload of the residents’ committees in commodity housing estates.
However, this was not the case in work-unit housing areas. In the Fifth Village, there
was a sense of alienation among residents. Despite living in close proximity, there was
very little interaction between work-unit residents and original residents. Physically, the
work-unit housing was still fenced oﬀ in a mini-compound within the residential area.
Although the ﬂats were privatized, some work-unit staﬀ still lived there. While in
subsequent years, some owners in the work-unit compound sold their ﬂats to the
new comers outside the work-units, the division between those who lived inside and
outside the compounds can still be seen. The residents lived in diﬀerent worlds, like one
retired teacher who had plenty of spare time but claimed that, “I cannot imagine
playing mahjong with them at the road side!” (interview with a resident, July 2002).
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When a female migrant was asked by the neighborhood oﬃcial to show her marriage
certiﬁcate (for contraceptive measures), she looked puzzled and said, “But we have been
married for over eighteen years!” (July 2002). In this larger professionally run neighbor-
hood administrative agency, nobody actually knew her well enough to provide evidence
of her marriage.
The decline of neighborhood interaction is also due to housing commodiﬁcation
(Forrest & Yip, 2007; Hazelzet & Wissink, 2012). The sale of housing to sitting tenants
has led to the retreat of workplaces in housing provision and property management,
which means that residents now have to rely on themselves for property maintenance.
They do not need to ask neighbors or colleagues in the work-units to help with their
property maintenance. The size of the estate and the professionalization and formaliza-
tion of neighborhood governance lead to reduced familiarity and the weakening of
social relations. Now, housing management is formally outside the remit of the resi-
dents’ committee. There is no reason for residents to ask for help from the residents’
committee.
It has been diﬃcult to set up voluntary organizations to help maintain public space
and organize neighborhood activities. The loss of neighborhood and reciprocal help has
not been compensated by the introduction of commercial property management,
because the property management company later abandoned its service, which is not
usual in similar public housing areas.
The privatization of work-unit housing has increased spatial mobility. Better oﬀ
residents moved out to other commodity housing areas. The creation of a rental stock,
although limited, has attracted private sector tenants. Rural migrants have come to this
neighborhood. Initially in the 2000s, the residents’ committee maintained a stock of
rental housing for rural migrants and helped to verify the status of rural migrants
before they could rent a property in the neighborhood. Since the mid-2000s property
owners have begun to manage their own properties or asked estate agencies to negotiate
with migrant renters. Migrants are registered with the local police station and are no
longer managed by the residents’ committee except for the issue of family planning.
Female migrants may be contacted by the residents’ committee for assistance for
contraception measures: “We also oﬀer free health check-up to women” (director of
residents’ committee, November 2014). Despite this service, migrant tenants do not
have much contact with the neighborhood agency.
Through professionalizing neighborhood social management, the state strengthened
neighborhood governance. At the same time, the state tried to incorporate voluntarism
into its formal structure of governance. But it is diﬃcult to mobilize residents into this
formal governance structure. The director of the street oﬃce blamed the low quality
(suzhi) of residents in this neighborhood: “It is diﬃcult to reach consensus here. It is
ﬁne to organize singing and dancing activities. But nobody really contributes to
neighborhood aﬀairs. To be honest, there are more people joining in the fun but
fewer do the work” (street oﬃce director, November 2014). However, to residents,
“We have to make a living ﬁrst. I am not claiming a low-income beneﬁt (dibao), and
why should I be an activist” (a resident, August 2008). “If there is a problem [with my
apartment], I would try to ﬁnd a company myself. If we have some problem in this
neighborhood, we don’t have money to sort it out. I doubt the residents’ committee
have the money” (a resident, August 2008). “I have nothing to do with neighborhood
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oﬃcials. I am a law-abiding person, anyway. I am just selling vegetables here in this
market. But the locals are quite friendly” (a temporary resident, August 2008). Observed
from this work-unit housing area, the feelings of alienation and disempowerment go
beyond the factors of the physical design of modern residential spaces and higher
residential mobility. It is a side eﬀect of formalized and professionalized neighborhood
governance.
Conclusion
This paper examines an ordinary public housing area built with work-unit housing and
municipal housing just before the introduction of the housing market and housing
privatization. The Fifth Village in Nanjing was invested in and developed by multiple
state work-units. The housing was allocated to their employees as public housing.
However, the neighborhood has changed from a brand-new estate to an “old and
dilapidated neighborhood” over about 25 years. After housing privatization, the state
work-units retreated from property management and related neighborhood services.
Further, along with the privatization of neighborhood premises into commercial opera-
tion, the residents’ committee – a neighborhood organization originally supported by
volunteers, housewives and retired people under the supervision of the street-level state
agency (the street oﬃce) – streamlined its function and has now become solely reliant
on government funding, staﬀed with salaried professional social workers. Surprisingly,
in the work-unit housing area, privatization does not empower residents into more
active neighborhood self-governance. The transfer of property management to the
commercial management company failed because of the low aﬀordability of residents,
creating an imperative for the state to return to a prominent presence in neighborhood
governance, while at the same time imposing a heavy burden for its operation.
However, the new form of governance is diﬀerent from the comprehensive approach
provided by state work-units. It is a more territorialized form of state agency operating
at the neighborhood level. Whenever possible, the state agency emphasizes the use of
market instruments and market operations. The co-existence of a professionalized and
“bureaucratic” (in the sense of formality) agency and commercial services provided by
various companies seriously discourages the development of reciprocal neighborhood
activities. Alienation and disempowerment are the side eﬀects of privatized and for-
malized neighborhood governance. While the narrative of neoliberalism would expect
the state’s retreat in the aftermath of mass housing privatization, there is now a well-
documented trend of consolidated state presence in China’s governance (Friedmann,
2011; Read, 2000, 2012; Tomba, 2014; Wu, 2002, 2017a). However, the operational
mechanism is not entirely known, particularly at the neighborhood level. The accounts
of commodiﬁcation and the continuation of state control seem to describe diﬀerent
aspects of urban transformation in urban China.
How are these two contradictory processes of privatization and enhanced state roles
intertwined in actual neighborhood governance? In contrast to simply juxtaposing them in
concepts such as “neoliberal authoritarianism” (Harvey, 2005), this paper attempts to
describe how they are actually operating together through a “coherent” process of govern-
ing the Chinese urban neighborhood. Rethinking the concept of the “neoliberal city,” an
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earlier attempt has been made to relate China’s development model and governance
approach (Wu, 2017b), but here I provide a close-up look at the neighborhood level.
Housing privatization helped the state work-units retreat from property manage-
ment. Property management companies were asked to take over the role. But low
income households could not aﬀord this market form of service provision. This could
mean an opportunity to develop reciprocal activities, which would enhance self-
governance capacity. Perhaps residents had low expectations or were not unhappy
with services in their neighborhood. But in reality, they witnessed the deterioration of
their neighborhood. They might be helpless because of the lack of self-governance
tradition under what Harvey (2005) described as the “authoritarianism.” But what is
found here is not the lingering authoritarianism. From the microscopic perspective, the
paper focuses on the mechanism through which the deployment of market instrument
has reduced neighborhood self-governance and in turn maintain “planning centrality”
(Wu, 2017a). The state required neighborhood services to take a commercial form. But
the vacuum left by privatization has not been ﬁlled by private management or home-
owners themselves, because of either low aﬀordability or distrust of private companies
even if the residents could aﬀord them. The supposedly self-organized residents’
committee is insulated from tapping into market resources and has been formalized
through exclusive government funding. This vacuum left by privatization has “necessa-
rily” been ﬁlled by the professionalization of neighborhood organizations.
From everyday neighborhood lives, we begin to understand the erosion of solidarity
in the working-class neighborhood in a post-socialism context (Stenning, 2005). The
underdevelopment of neighborhood self-governance is not simply state restriction but
also more importantly the prevailing market approach over reciprocal relations in the
context of fading neighborhood resources. All resources available to the neighborhood
have been commoditized. As a result, housing privatization does not reduce residents’
dependence on the state, but rather creates an imperative for the state to return to an
enhanced governance.
Notes
1. This was the concern raised both in an interview with a street oﬃcer in 2004 and ten years
later in 2014 by with another oﬃcer.
2. This is the conclusion inferred by this study, because our interviewees constantly men-
tioned the importance of “ﬁnancial independence,” suggesting that “we surely could have
done more at our wish if we had our own source of money” (a street oﬃcer,
November 2014).
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